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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JEANNIE HARRISON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

District Court No. 950901694

FREE SPIRIT RECREATION,
INC.,

Court of Appeals No. 950706-CA
Priority No. 15

Defendant and Appellee.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1995).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Whether the trial court correctly determined as a matter of law that
the Assumption of Risk and Release of Liability Agreement signed by
Appellant operated as a complete bar against the claims brought by
Appellant against Appellee.

II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

Standard of Review for a Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6) of
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
When determining whether a trial court properly granted a rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the appellate court accepts the factual
allegations in the complaint as true and considers them and all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.
The propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law, and the
appellate court gives the trial court's ruling no deference and reviews it
under a correctness standard. Prows v. State. 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991);
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194 (Utah
1991); Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990); Wright
v. Univ. of Utah. 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Anderson v. Dean
Witter Reynolds. Inc.. 841 P.2d 742 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied,
853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
B.

Standard of Review for the Interpretation of a Contract
The interpretation of a written contract is a question of law

determined by the words of the agreement. Republic Group. Inc. v. Won2

Door Corp.. 883 P.2d 285 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In construing a
contract, the trial court must give effect to the intentions of the parties,
and where possible, the intentions of the parties should be derived from an
examination of the text of the contract. kL In other words, the court
must first look to the four corners of the document to determine the intent
of the parties. Anesthesiologists Associates of Ogden v. St. Benedict's
Hosp.. 852 P.2d 1030 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). When interpreting a
contract, the court looks at the contract as a whole to determine the
parties' intent, and will accord common, accepted meanings to the words
and phrases whenever possible. Gordon v. CRS Consulting Eng'g. Inc..
820 P.2d 492 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). If the court concludes that a contract
is ambiguous from its text, extrinsic evidence should be considered by the
trial court to ascertain the parties' intent. kL; Kimball v. Campbell. 699
P.2d 714 (Utah 1985).
If a trial court interprets a contract without considering extrinsic
evidence, its decision will be accorded no particular weight and will be
reviewed under a correctness standard. Kimball. 699 P.2d 714. If the
contract is ambiguous and the trial court proceeds to consider extrinsic

3

evidence respecting the intentions of the parties, then the appellate court
review is strictly limited. Id.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Rule 12(b)(6) 01 the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(6) is
attached in Addendum as Exhibit "A."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case arose from an injury allegedly sustained as the result of the
participation of Plaintiff and Appellant, Jeannie Harrison ("Harrison"), in
shock cord jumping (commonly referred to as "bungee jumping") at a
shock cord tower operated by Defendant and Appellee, Free Spirit
Recreation, Inc. ("Free Spirit"), on July 21, 1994. (Memorandum in
Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 1; R. 17). The subject shock
cord jumping facility is located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah (Jd.).

4

II.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE
TRIAL COURT
On or about March 8, 1995, Harrison filed her Complaint in the
Third Judicial District Court, Civil No. 950901694 PI. (Complaint at 3;
R. 3). On or about April 10, 1995, Free Spirit filed its Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs Complaint and Memorandum in Support of Motion. (Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint at 2; R. 16; Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Dismiss at 7; R. 23). On or about April 20, 1995, Harrison
filed her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
(Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 4; R.
31). On or about May 10, 1995, Free Spirit filed its Reply Memorandum.
(Reply Memorandum at 10; R. 44).
The trial court ruled that Free Spirit's Motion to Dismiss should be
granted. (Minute Entry at 1, attached in Addendum as Exhibit "B"; R.
51; Order at 2, attached in Addendum as Exhibit "C"; R. 58-59). The
trial court ruled that the Release of Liability Agreement signed by
Harrison operated as a bar to Harrison's claim against Free Spirit. (Id-)This appeal followed. (Notice of Appeal; R. 61-62).
5

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This case arose as the result of an injury allegedly

sustained by Harrison while participating in bungee jumping at a bungee
jumping tower operated by Free Spirit, located in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah. (Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at
1; R. 17). The incident occurred on July 21, 1994. (Id.).
2.

On or about March 8, 1995, Harrison filed a Complaint

for injuries arising out of the bungee jumping occurrence of July 21, 1994.
(Complaint at 3; R. 3). The case was assigned to the Honorable Sandra
N. Peuler of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
Civil No. 950901694. (Id. at 1-3; R. 1-3).
3.

In her Complaint, Harrison alleged against Free Spirit

that its employee improperly instructed her on where to put her hands
during the jump, and, as a result, she received permanent damage to her
finger. (Complaint at 1-2; R. 1-2). Harrison did not plead a cause of
action for willful and wanton misconduct or gross negligence against Free
Spirit. (Id. at 1-3; R. 1-3).

6

4.

Prior to participating in bungee jumping on the date of

the alleged injury, Harrison signed an agreement entitled "Assumption of
Risk and Release of Liability." (Assumption of Risk and Release of
Liability, attached in Addendum as Exhibit "D"; R. 25). Harrison signed
the Assumption of Risk and Release of Liability Agreement on the line
identified as applicant's signature, and initialled the Agreement in seven
other spaces on the Agreement. (Id-, Exhibit "D").
5.

Free Spirit filed its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs

Complaint on April 10, 1995. (Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint at
2; R. 15-16; Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 7; R. 1723). Free Spirit argued that under the law, a patron who signs an
agreement exempting a recreational or amusement facility from liability for
negligence will be bound by that agreement and cannot thereafter recover
for personal injuries sustained while participating in the amusement or
recreational activity. (Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 27; R. 18-23). On or about April 20, 1995, Harrison filed her
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and Free
Spirit subsequently filed its Reply Memorandum. (Memorandum in

7

Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 4; R. 31; Reply
Memorandum at 10; R. 44).
6.

After reviewing the pleadings, Judge Peuler ruled that

Free Spirit's Motion to Dismiss should be granted. (Minute Entry at 1,
Exhibit "B"; R. 51; Order at 1-2, Exhibit "C"; R. 58-59). The trial court
ruled that the Assumption of Risk and Release of Liability Agreement
signed by Harrison operated as a complete bar to Harrison's claim against
Free Spirit. (Id.). Harrison appeals from that ruling. (Notice of Appeal;
R. 61-62 ).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

Judicial authority has held that release of liability agreements

entered into by patrons of recreational facilities are valid and enforceable.
The law in Utah is consistent in providing that one may contract to protect
himself against losses sustained by his own negligence. The trial court
correctly concluded upon an examination of the words of the Assumption
of Risk and Release of Liability Agreement that it clearly and
unambiguously operates as a complete bar to Harrison's claim of injuries
sustained during the bungee jumping activity.

8

II.

Harrison incorrectly asserts that the trial court's dismissal of

her action was premature and that she should be able to conduct discovery.
A rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged in the complaint
but challenges the plaintiff's right to relief based on those facts. Because
the trial court accepted the allegations in Harrison's Complaint as true,
there is no need to conduct further discovery to test the truthfulness of the
allegations.
In addition, the interpretation of the Release Agreement is a question
of law to be determined by the words of the Agreement. The trial court
considered the pleadings and determined from the four corners of the
Agreement that it precluded Harrison from bringing an action.
Furthermore, Harrison is not entitled to conduct discovery on the
application of governmental standards or whether Free Spirit employees
acted with willful and wanton negligence because these allegations were
not pled in the Complaint, and further, the Plaintiff cannot support any
such allegations in light of the facts alleged in the Complaint. Harrison
cannot save her Complaint from being dismissed through speculative

9

allegations that are neither alleged in the Complaint nor supported by the
facts.
III. The alleged negligence of Free Spirit's employees and the
injury to Harrison's hands are hazards encompassed within the purview of
the Assumption of Risk and Release of Liability signed by Harrison. The
language of the Release Agreement at issue in the present case could not
be more clear: It releases Free Spirit from liability for negligence of its
employees and for any and all injuries and damages suffered by Harrison
as a result of her participation in bungee jumping. In order for the
Release Agreement to be enforceable, it is not necessary that the releasing
party have specific knowledge of every injury that may occur from the
activity, or every means by which the injury may occur. Because
Harrison agreed to assume the risk of all injury however caused, and
agreed to release Free Spirit from any and all injury even if it resulted
through the negligence of Free Spirit's employees, the Release Agreement
operates as a complete bar to Harrison's claims against Free Spirit.
IV. Judicial Authority has held that agreements releasing one from
his or her negligence are not unconscionable. The intent to release Free

10

Spirit from liability is clearly expressed and easily comprehended, and
Harrison's multiple signatures on the Agreement indicate she carefully
read and comprehended the Agreement before signing it. There is no
evidence that Harrison was induced into signing the Agreement in an
unconscionable manner or that the Agreement is otherwise invalid.
Bungee jumping does not involve an essential activity where Harrison had
no alternative but to participate. Contrary to Harrison's argments, the
Agreement is valid, and the trial court correctly determined that the
Agreement bars Harrison's claims against Free Spirit.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE
ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND RELEASE OF LIABILITY
AGREEMENT SIGNED BY HARRISON OPERATED AS
A COMPLETE BAR TO HARRISON'S CLAIM OF
INJURY AGAINST FREE SPIRIT.
Prior to engaging in the bungee jumping activity that gave rise to the
present suit, Harrison signed an agreement entitled "Assumption of Risk
and Release of Liability." Assumption of Risk and Release of Liability,
Exhibit "D"; R. 25. This Agreement provides in part as follows:

11

I am hereby aware that shock cord jumping (commonly
referred to as "Bungee Jumping") is a hazardous activity
and I am voluntarily participating in this activity with full
knowledge of the danger involved and hereby agree to
accept any and all risk of injury or death.
Id., Exhibit "D"; R. 25. The Agreement further states:
As lawful consideration for being permitted by Free
Spirit Recreation to participate in these activities and rent
their equipment, I hereby agree that I, my heirs,
distributes, guardians, legal representatives, and assigned
shall not make a claim against, sue, attach the property
of, or prosecute Free Spirit Recreation for injury or
damage resulting from the negligence or other acts
however caused by any employees, agent, or contractor
of Free Spirit Recreation as a result of my participation
in shock cord jumping. In addition, I hereby release and
discharge the company from all actions, claims, or
demands that I, my heirs, distributes, guardians, legal
representatives, or assigned now have or may here after
have for injury or damage resulting from my
participation in shock cord jumping activities.
Id. Exhibit "D"; R. 25.
Judicial authority has held that a patron who signs an
agreement exempting a recreational or amusement facility from
liability for negligence will be bound by that agreement and cannot
thereafter recover for personal injuries sustained while participating
in the amusement or recreational activity. The law in Utah has long

12

held that "one may contract to protect himself against liability for
loss caused by his negligence." Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. First
Sec. Corp.. 341 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah 1959); Freund v. Utah Power
& Light Co.. 793 P.2d 362 (Utah 1990); Healev v. J.B. Sheet
Metal. Inc.. 892 P.2d 1047 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The Washington
State Court of Appeals recently held that a release of liability
contract entered into by the injured party bars that party from
recovery against defendant for personal injuries or death allegedly
caused by the negligence of the defendant. Boyce v. West. 862 P.2d
592 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). The Boyce case involved a wrongful
death action brought by the plaintiff on behalf of her son who died
during a scuba diving accident while taking scuba lessons.1
The Supreme Court of Wyoming has held that "agreements
absolving participants and proprietors from negligence liability
i See also Hewitt v. Miller. 521 P.2d 244, 248 (Wash. Ct. App.
1974) (This case also involved an action against scuba diving instructors
for the death of a scuba diving student who signed a release of liability in
favor of the instructors. The court held: "Based upon the undisputed
facts in the record and upon our review of the law of this state, we hold
that the release in question is valid and therefore the trial court correctly
determined that it operates as a complete bar to appellant's lawsuit based
upon allegations of negligence.")
13

during hazardous recreational activities are enforceable . . . ."
Schutkowski v. Carev. 725 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Wyo. 1986); see also
Milligan v. Big Vallev Corp. 754 P.2d 1063 (Wyo. 1988). In
Schutkowski v. Carev. the plaintiff, a sky diving student, filed a
complaint against her sky diving instructors for injuries she allegedly
sustained during her first sky diving jump. Plaintiffs complaint
alleged that the sky diving instructors were negligent in failing to
adequately instruct plaintiff on proper sky diving procedures.
The trial court in Carey found that a "Release and Indemnity
Agreement" signed by plaintiff excused the instructors. Carey, at
1062. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment based on the release agreement, and the Wyoming
Supreme Court affirmed. In arriving at its decision, the Wyoming
Court referred to an Ohio state court opinion which reads as follows:
"A participant in recreational activity is free to contract with the
proprietor of such activity so as to relieve the proprietor of
responsibility for damages or injuries to the participant caused by the
negligence of the proprietor . . . ." Id. at 1060 (quoting Cain v.

14

Cleveland Parachute Training Center. 457 N.E.2d 1185, 1187 (Ohio
1983)).
Many jurisdictions from around the country have taken the
same position as the Wyoming and Washington courts with respect
to the enforceability of release of liability agreements as applied to
recreational activities. Owen v. Vic Tanny's Enterprises. 199
N.E.2d 280 (111. 1964); Lee v. Allied Sports Associates. Inc.. 209
A.2d 329 (Mass. 1965); Moss v. Fortune. 340 S.W.2d 902 (Tenn.
1960); Leev. Sun Vallev Co.. 695 P.2d 361 (Idaho 1984); Jones v.
Dressel. 623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981); Skotak v. Vic Tannv Int'l.
Inc.. 513 N.W.2d 5 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); LaFrenz v. Lake
County Fair Bd.. 360 N.E.2d 605 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977); DeBoer v.
Florida Offroaders Driver's Ass'n. Inc.. 622 So.2d 1134 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1993); Szczotka v. Snowridge. Inc.. 869 F. Supp 247 (D.
VT. 1994) (interpreting Vermont state law); Bertotti v. Charlotte
Motor Speedway. 893 F. Supp. 565 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (interpreting
North Carolina state law); Haines v. St. Charles Speedway. Inc..
874 F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1989) (interpreting Missouri state law).

15

In this case, the Release Agreement signed by Harrison clearly
and unambiguously releases Free Spirit from any liability as a result
of Harrison's participation in the bungee jumping activity, including
injuries resulting from Free Spirit's alleged negligence. In addition
to signing the Release Agreement on the line identified as applicant's
signature, Harrison initialled the agreement in seven other spaces on
the Agreement. Assumption of Risk and Release of Liability,
Exhibit "D"; R. 25. The Release Agreement clearly demonstrates
that Harrison had a fair opportunity to review its contents and
carefully consider the risks she was assuming before signing the
document and participating in the bungee jump.
The trial court found from its examination of the four corners
of the Agreement that the parties intended to release Free Spirit from
liability for Plaintiff's injuries. Based on the facts of this case and
the governing legal authority, the trial court correctly interpreted the
Release Agreement entered into by Harrison to operate as a complete
bar to Harrison's claim against Free Spirit.

16

II.
THE VALIDITY OF THE RELEASE AGREEMENT
IS A LEGAL QUESTION DECIDED BY AN
EXAMINATION OF THE DOCUMENT.
In bringing this appeal, Harrison argues that Free Spirit's
Motion to Dismiss was premature and that she should be able to
obtain discovery showing that the actions of Free Spirit's employees
and the injury she received fall outside the purview of the Release
Agreement. Brief of Appellant at 4. The Utah Supreme Court has
explained Rule 12(b)(6) as follows: "A rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss admits the facts alleged in the complaint but challenges the
plaintiffs right to relief based on those facts." St. Benedict's Dev.
Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). As
the trial court had to accept all facts in the Complaint as being true,
there is no need to conduct discovery to test the truthfulness of the
allegations.
Free Spirit brought its Motion to Dismiss on the basis that,
even if Harrison's allegations were accepted as true, the Release
Agreement entered into by Harrison operates as a complete bar to

17

her claims for relief. The question of whether Harrison is prohibited
from recovery pursuant to the Release Agreement is a legal question.
The Supreme Court of Wyoming held as follows: "Exculpatory
agreements, also referred to as releases, are contractual in nature.
Interpretation and construction of contractual agreements are
questions of law for the court to decide." Milligan v. Big Valley
Corp.. 754 P.2d 1063, 1065 (Wyo. 1988) (citations omitted); Jones
v. Dressel. 623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981). The Utah Supreme Court
has consistently held that the interpretation of a written contract is a
question of law determined by the words of the agreement. Kimball
v. Campbell. 699 P.2d 714 (Utah 1985); Republic Group. Inc. v.
Won-Door Corp.. 883 P.2d 285 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Accordingly, the trial judge considered the pleadings and determined
as a matter of law that the Release Agreement was unambiguous and
that it evidenced an intent of the parties to operate as a bar to
Harrison's claims against Free Spirit. Minute Entry at 1, Exhibit
"B"; R. 51. In her Complaint, Harrison failed to allege any factual

18

scenario under which she would be able to prevail against Free
Spirit, therefore the trial court's ruling was proper.
Harrison also argues on appeal that whether Free Spirit's
bungee jumping facility and equipment met governmental standards
is a question that requires further discovery. Brief of Appellant at 4.
Harrison then acknowledges that violation of governmental standards
was not pled, purportedly because of lack of information, and asserts
that she is entitled to discovery to determine if any such regulations
were in fact violated. Id. These arguments, however, are
insufficient to vacate the dismissal of Harrison's complaint.
Harrison did not allege in her Complaint that the bungee cord was in
violation of any governmental standards, nor did she name the
governmental standards that may have been violated. Complaint 1-3;
R. 1-3. Furthermore, Harrison has no support that a governmental
regulation would set the standard of care, or that the violation of a
statute or regulation would operate to void a release of liability
agreement. Harrison's arguments are nothing more than speculation
and conjecture asserted to save the Complaint from dismissal.

19

The courts have consistently held that a plaintiff cannot save a
complaint from dismissal "by merely restating the conclusory
allegations contained in his complaint, and amplifying them only
with speculation about what discovery might uncover." Bryant v.
O'Connor. 848 F.2d 1064, 1067 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting
Contemporary Mission. Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv.. 648 F.2d 97, 107
(2d Cir. 1981)). Harrison's speculative allegations must also fail on
appeal.
In addition, Harrison seeks to circumvent the effect of the
Release Agreement by claiming that the Agreement does not bar a
claim based on gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct
on the part of Free Spirit's employee. Brief of Appellant at 7-8.
Harrison argues that many of the cases cited by Free Spirit in its
memoranda in support of its Motion to Dismiss "conditioned the
imposition of the release 'subject to willful misconduct limitations.'"
Brief of Appellant at 8. In other words, willful or wanton
misconduct by the defendant's employees renders a release of
liability invalid.
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This argument is immaterial in the present case because
Harrison did not allege in her Complaint that Free Spirit's conduct
was willful or wanton. Complaint 1-3; R. 1-3. Harrison merely
asserted in her Complaint that the instruction from Free Spirit's
employee on where to hold her hands was improper. Id. Because
willful and wanton misconduct was never pled, Harrison can not
make those speculative allegations on appeal to reverse the decision
of the trial court.
Furthermore, Harrison cannot support a claim of willful and
wanton misconduct in light of the facts alleged in her Complaint.
Harrison alleges in her Complaint that when she asked a Free Spirit
employee where to place her hands during the bungee jumping
activity, that she was improperly instructed on where to place her
hands during the jump. Complaint 1-3; R. 1-3. Even assuming the
truthfulness of these allegations, this alleged wrongful conduct does
not rise to the level of willful or wanton. Harrison may not now
attempt to bolster her Complaint with speculative allegations in order
to vacate the dismissal of her Complaint.
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III.
THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF FREE SPIRIT'S
EMPLOYEES AND THE INJURY TO PLAINTIFF'S
HANDS ARE HAZARDS ENCOMPASSED BY THE
ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND RELEASE OF LIABILITY
AGREEMENT.
Harrison specifically contends in her Brief of Appellant that the
Kelease Agreement signed by Plaintiff does not bar her claim against
Defendant because the actions of Free Spirit Recreation's employees
in negligently instructing Plaintiff on where to put her hands during
the jump was not a foreseeable and known risk which Plaintiff
assumed in signing the release. Brief of Appellant at 5. Plaintiff
further contends that the injury to her hands was not a risk which
she had knowledge of in executing the Release Agreement. Id.
Contrary to Harrison's contentions, the negligent acts of Free
Spirit's employees and the injury to Harrison's hands are clearly
hazards encompassed by the language of the Release Agreement.
The first paragraph of the Agreement states as follows: "I am hereby
aware that shock cord jumping . . . is a hazardous activity and I am
voluntarily participating in this activity with full knowledge of the
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danger involved and hereby agree to accept any and all risk of injury
or death. (Please initial) [Harrison's initials]." Assumption of Risk
and Release of Liability 1 1, Exhibit "D"; R. 25 (emphasis added).
In the second paragraph, the Agreement states that the signer "shall
not make a claim against, sue, attach the property of, or prosecute
Free Spirit Recreation for injury or damage . . . ."Id. % 2, Exhibit
"D"; R. 25 (emphasis added). The second paragraph further
provides that Harrison releases and discharges the company from all
actions "for injury or damage resulting from my participation in
shock cord jumping activities. (Please initial) [Harrison's initials]"
Id., Exhibit "D"; R. 25 (emphasis added). The third paragraph of
the Release Agreement states that Harrison will "HOLD
HARMLESS the Christensen Corp. for any claims in the event of
any injuries, or damages as a result of my participation in shock
cord jumping activities." (Please initial) [Harrison's initials.]" Id. 1
3, Exhibit "D"; R. 25 (emphasis added).
Nowhere does the Release Agreement limit the assumed risks
to only certain injuries as Harrison argues. To the contrary, the
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above referenced language makes clear that there are many injuries
that could result from bungee jumping and Free Spirit will be
released from liability for any injury or damage arising from the
activity. Id. f 1, 2 and 3. Exhibit "D"; R. 25.
Harrison cites to paragraph 4 of the Release Agreement as
support for her contention that the known risks of injury are limited
to back or neck strain. Appellant's Brief at 6. This paragraph,
however, is not intended to set forth a list of injuries that may result
from bungee jumping. Rather, the provision in paragraph 4 requires
the participant to acknowledge that he is in good physical condition
and to notify Free Spirit of any physical impairments. Assumption
of Risk and Release of Liability 1 4, Exhibit "D"; R. 25. As an
example of some of the impairments which should be disclosed, the
Agreement lists heart problems, back and neck problems, SI joint,
pelvis, eye surgery, etc. IcL, Exhibit "D"; R. 25. The "etc."
signifies that this is not an exhaustive list and that there could be
many more impairments to be concerned about in this type of
hazardous activity. Paragraph 4 of the Release Agreement is
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consistent with the rest of the release in notifying the signer that
shock cord jumping is a hazardous activity, which requires the
participant to be in good overall physical condition to participate.
In addition, the negligent acts of Free Spirit's employees is a
risk that is expressly set forth in the Release Agreement. Paragraph
2 of the Agreement states in unambiguous terms that "I hereby agree
that I . . . shall not make a claim against . . . Free Spirit Recreation
for injury or damage resulting from the negligence or other acts
however caused by any employees, agent, or contractor of Free
Spirit Recreation as a result of my participation in shock cord
jumping." Id. 1f 2, Exhibit "D"; R. 25 (emphasis added). The
language could not be more clear. The alleged negligence of Free
Spirit's employees in instructing Harrison on where to put her hands
during the jump is clearly within the scope of the Release
Agreement. Harrison agreed to release Free Spirit for her injury
however caused, including an injury caused by the negligent
instruction of a patron by an employee in the use of the bungee
jumping harness and cord. Id., Exhibit "D"; R. 25.
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Harrison would have the Court believe that the Release
Agreement is invalid unless it lists every injury that could possibly
occur to a bungee jump participant and every conceivable means by
which an injury could occur. Brief of Appellant at 5-6. Contrary to
Harrison's arguments, it is not necessary that the releasing party
have specific knowledge of every injury that may occur from the
activity or every means by which the injury may occur in order for
the release of liability to be enforceable. As the court of appeals in
Florida recently held: "for a release to be effective, it is not
necessary to list each possible class of releasor or each possible
manner in which a releasor could be injured during an inherently
dangerous event. The possibilities are endless." DeBoer v. Florida
Offroaders Driver's Ass'n. Inc.. 622 So.2d 1134, 1136 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1993).
In the case of Boyce v. West. 862 P.2d 592 (Wash. Ct. App.
1993), an opinion cited earlier in this Brief, the plaintiff made the
same arguments as Harrison makes in the present case in an attempt
to void a release of liability agreement in favor of the defendants.
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The Boyce case involved a wrongful death action brought by the
plaintiff on behalf of her son who died during a scuba diving
accident while taking scuba lessons as part of a college course at
Gonzaga University. The personal representative of the decedent
alleged that the negligence of the diving instructor, James West,
caused the wrongful death. Plaintiff named as defendants both Mr.
West and Gonzaga University.
Before taking the scuba lessons, the decedent signed a release
of liability and assumption of risk agreement.2 The defendants in
2 The release of liability and assumption of risk provisions at issue in
Boyce read in part as follows:
I understand and agree that neither . . . Gonzaga
University . . . nor [PADI] may be held liable in any way for
any occurrence in connection with this diving class that may
result in injury, death, or other damages to me or my family,
heirs, or assigns, . . . and further to save and hold harmless
said program and persons from any claim by me, or my
family, estate, heirs, or assigns, arising out of my enrollment
and participation in this course.
It is the intention of [Peter Boyce] by this instrument to
exempt and release [Gonzaga University] and [PADI] from all
liability whatsoever for personal injury, property damage or
wrongful death caused by negligence.
(continued...)
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Boyce moved for summary judgment on the basis that the release
agreement precluded plaintiff from recovery. The trial court agreed
and granted the summary judgment motion. On appeal, plaintiff
argued, as Harrison does in her Brief of Appellant, that the release
of liability agreement only barred recovery for injuries resulting
from "known risks voluntarily assumed" and that in signing the
release the decedent did not know or assume the risk of negligent
instruction and supervision by the scuba instructor, Mr. West.
Boyce. 862 P.2d at 597.
In affirming the trial court's ruling on defendant's summary
judgment motion, the Boyce Court held that "Mr. Boyce's express
assumption of all risks associated with his enrollment in the scuba
diving course bars a claim for recovery." Id. at 598 (citing W.
Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on
2(... continued)
[I]n consideration of being allowed to enroll in this
course, I hereby personally assume all risks in connection with
said course, for any harm, injury or damage that may befall
me while I am enrolled as a student of the course, including all
risks connected therewith . . . .
Boyce, 862 P.2d 595 n. 2 & 3.
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Torts § 68, at 484 (5th ed. 1984)). In arriving at its decision, the
court reasoned that '"knowledge of a particular risk is unnecessary
when there is an express agreement to assume all risk; by express
agreement a "plaintiff may undertake to assume all of the risks of a
particular . . . situation, whether they are known or unknown to
him.'"" Id. at 598 (quoting Madison v. Superior Court. 250 Cal.
Rptr. 299 (Cal. 1988) (quoting Coates v. Newhall Land & Farming.
Inc^, 236 Cal. Rptr. 181 (Cal. 1987) (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original))). The court then held:
[negligent instruction and supervision are clearly risks
associated with being a student in a scuba diving course
and are encompassed by the broad language of the
contract. That Mr. Boyce [decedent] may not have
specifically considered the possibility of instructor
negligence when he signed the release does not invalidate
his express assumption of all risks associated with his
participation in the course.
Id. (emphasis in original).
The same is true in this case. It is not necessary that Harrison
have knowledge of a particular act of negligence or a particular
injury when she made an express agreement to assume all risks of
injury or damage and release Free Spirit from all liability. In
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executing the Release Agreement, Harrison agreed to assume "any
and all risk of injury or death" associated with the shock cord
jumping activity. Assumption of Risk and Release of Liability t 1,
Exhibit "D"; R. 25. The negligent acts of Free Spirit's employees
and the injury to Harrison's hands are clearly hazards encompassed
by the language of the Release Agreement. This Agreement operates
as a complete bar to Harrison's claims against Free Spirit, and,
accordingly, the trial court correctly dismissed Harrison's action
against Free Spirit.
IV.
THE RELEASE AGREEMENT IS NOT
UNCONSCIONABLE
A.

Agreements Which Exempt a Recreational Facility from
Liability for Its Own Negligence Are Valid and Enforceable
Under the Law.
Harrison next contends in her Brief that the Release Agreement

is unconscionable because it absolves Free Spirit of liability as a
result of its own negligence. Brief of Appellant at 6-7. In making
this argument, Harrison fails to cite to any legal authority in support
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of her position and ignores the authority which holds that agreements
purporting to limit one's liability for negligence are enforceable.
As mentioned previously, the Wyoming Supreme Court held
that " [e]xculpatory agreements, releasing parties from negligence
liability for damages or injury, are valid and enforceable . . . ."
Milligan. 754 P.2d at 1065. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
determined that "[i]n Missouri an agreement to exempt one from the
consequences of negligence is not against public policy." Haines v.
St. Charles Speedway. Inc.. 874 F.2d 572, 575 (8th Cir. 1988).
Other jurisdictions have arrived at this same conclusion. DeBoer.
622 So.2d 1134; Boyce. 862 P.2d 592; LaFrenz v. Lake County
Fair Bd.. 360 N.E.2d 605 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977).3
The Utah Appellate Courts have similarly held that agreements
which obligate one party to assume responsibility for the negligence
of another are enforceable. Walker Bank & Trust Co.. 341 P.2d
944; Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co.. 658 P.2d
1187 (Utah 1983); Freund, 793 P.2d 362; Healev. 892 P.2d 1047.

3 See other opinions cited on page 15 of this Brief.
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The Utah Supreme Court held that "an indemnity agreement which
purports to make a party respond for the negligence of another" is
enforceable when that intention is "'clearly and unequivocally
expressed.'" Freund. 793 P.2d at 370 (quoting Shell Oil Co.. 658
P.2dat 1189).
Here, the intent to release Free Spirit from any liability as a
result of Harrison's participation in the bungee jump activity is
clearly expressed and easily comprehended in the Release
Agreement. In addition to signing the Release Agreement, Harrison
initialled the agreement in 7 other places signifying that she had
read, comprehended, and agreed to the provisions. Assumption of
Risk and Release of Liability, Exhibit "D"; R. 25.
B.

The Release Agreement was Fairly Negotiated.
Harrison does not allege, nor can she assert, that the agreement

was unfairly negotiated. As previously mentioned, the Release
Agreement is comprehensible and Harrison signed and initialled the
agreement in 8 different places. Assumption of Risk and Release of
Liability, Exhibit "D"; R. 25. There is no evidence or allegation
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that Harrison was pressured into signing the Agreement or that she
didn't have adequate opportunity to review the Agreement. Harrison
had the choice of whether to participate in the activity and could
have chosen not to participate.4 Bungee jumping does not involve
an essential activity such as contracting with a utility company or a
hospital, where the plaintiff has no reasonable alternative but to use
the product or service.5
Harrison otherwise fails to show that the Release Agreement is
unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. Consequently,
Harrison's argument in this regard must fail and the trial court's
ruling should be affirmed.

4 See DeBoer. 622 So.2d at 1136 (there is no inequality of
bargaining power in recreational settings where the releasor voluntarily
participates in the activity).
5 See Milligan. 754 P.2d at 1067 ("Grand Targhee [defendant] did
not force Dean Griffin [decedent] to ski in the race. Griffin could have
chosen not to race. Skiing in the race was not a matter of practical
necessity for the public, and putting on the race was not an essential
service. Nor was skiing in the race the only reasonable alternative. Thus,
no decisive bargaining advantage or disadvantage existed. Further, no
evidence suggests that the decedent was unfairly pressured into signing the
agreement or that he was deprived of an opportunity to understand its
implications.").
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant and Appellee, Free Spirit
Recreation, Inc., respectfully requests that the Order of the trial
court granting Free Spirit's Motion to Dismiss be affirmed, the
appeal of Harrison be dismissed, and Free Spirit be awarded its costs
on appeal.
./

DATED this J1Y

day of January, 1996.
MORGAN & HANSEN

Stephen G. Morgan
Mitchel T. Rice
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellee
Free Spirit Recreation, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the^ / day of January, 1996, I caused
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEE to be hand-delivered to the following:

Ronald E. Dalby, Esq.
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES
4516 South 700 East, Suite 280
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 12

Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty
days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless otherwise expressly provided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto
within twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his
reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service
of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under
this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed
by order of the court:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten
days after notice of the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of
the more definite statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim.
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction
over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for
relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed
but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court
orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a
more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the
motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days
after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the
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court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such
order as it deems just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading upon
him, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this
rule may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available
to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein
all defenses and objections then available to him which this rule permits to be
raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this
rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has
made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join
an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that,
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received.
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading
after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be
deemed a waiver of such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the
plaintiff to file a S300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff.
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the
United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially similar to Rule 12, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Motions generally,
U.R.C.P. 7.
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Motion for judgment on pleadings.
—Matters outside of pleadings.
Answers to interrogatories.
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—Purpose.
Delay.
Obtaining evidence.
Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
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—Improper.
—Standard.
—Standard of review.
Motion to dismiss for lack of venue.
—Forum-selection clause in contract.
Presentation of defenses.
—How presented.
Affirmative defenses.
Divorce.
Election of remedies.
Failure to state claim upon which relief
can be granted.
General and special appearances.
Statute of frauds.
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Iciiiiiiic Harrison,
Plaintiff,

MIN I JTE ENTRY
Civil No. 950901694 PI

vs.
JUDGE Si \ NDR A N PEI II ER
Free Spirit Recreation, h
The 49th Street Galleria,
Defendants.
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court

j s defendant Free Spirit Recreation Incorporated's Motion to Dismiss

plaintiffs complaint based upon Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules o ^

a .ocedure. The court

ha \ ing review eci the pljeajii ngs filed in th is matter and pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the U'tahCode
of Judicial Administration now enters the following ruling.
,rv the Release of Liability Agreement signed by plaintiff,
plainti

^ matter based upon

Fhe agreement operates as a bar to

* t.
f

* Counse. ^ directed

.- rare an order consistent with this ruling.

.oJ&J-C*
Sandra N. Peuler,
District Court. Judge
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day of June, 1995.

Ronald E. Dalby
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. O. Box 17345
Salt Lake City, UT 84117-0345
Stephen G. Morgan
MORGAN & HANSEN
Attorney for Defendant Free Spirit
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Robert G. Gilchrist
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorney for Defendant 49th Street Galleria
P. O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465
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JEANNiL HARRISON.
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 950901694 PI

kilE SPIRIT RECREATION. INC.,
; THE 49TH STREET GALLERIA.

Judge Sandra N. Peuler

This matter came before the Court < . • i • -fondant Free Spirit Recreation, Inc.'s Motion
to

Plaintiffs Complair

"

uiew j . oiurev appearing as

• ror Piainnrr. ana Stephen G. Morgan and Mitchei :

-eadine the Mo on

: appearing as attorneys for

.-•s, the memoranda in support thereof, and the

IT IS ORDERED FUA
1.

I he Muiiuii io Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint is hereby granted;

2.

Plaintiffs Complaint against Defendant Free Spirit Recreation, Inc. is hereby

dismissed with prejudice.
Dated this I O day of &ne, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

fr-^^z,- M c v V )
Sandra N. Peuler

Judj
Judge
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9:40 ;SWETT&CRAWFORD GROiP-

ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND RELEASE OF LIABILITY
I am hereby aware that shock cord jumping (commonly referred to a* "Bungee Jumping") is. a hazardous activity and \ am
voluntarily participating in thisac^viy^tltfull knowledge of the danger involved and hereby agree to accept any and ail tltk
of injury or death. (Please initial)^K£J£&
As lawful consideration for being permitted by<£rge Spirit Recreationjo participate in these activities and rent their
equipment I hereby agrae that I, my heirs, dlstrlbules^guardlans, legal representatives, and assigned shall not make a claim
against, sua,attacti the property of, or prosecute Free Spirit Recreation for injury of damage resulting from the negligence or
other acts however caused by any employees, agent or contractor of FreeSpirit ftecrsai^aaa^reault of my participation in
shock cord jumping. In addition, I hereby release and discharge the company Upif^Sc^slclkms,
or demands that I, my
heirs, distributee, guardians, legal representatives, or assigned now have owTifiOpra ajjffi hive for Injury or damage
resulting from my participation in shock cord jumpino^ivJljfflS) (glsajgjnipl) S ^ ^ S S S H H r
I hereby state that I will HOLD HARMLESS the *V*m:i*mva^^
tor
in the event ot y y ^ u j f ^ or damages as a result of my participation in shock^c&rtfjurtfping activities.
(Please Initial) j

any claims

I am Jn good physical health or have notified Free Spirit Recreation of any physical impairments, or limitations (le.; history oJ
any heart or back and neck problems, St Joint, pelvis, aye a u r g ^ etjy thj^may atfect my physical and mental^wal^being'
during or after shock cord jumping activities. (Please initial) J
I hereby declare that 1 am not under the influence of drugt o^lcchoi and am of sound mind. (Please Iniftaf)
I hereby declare that I am 18 years of age or older, (Please initial) |
AGE VERIFICATION
Drivers Ucanse/t.D. No.

te^CTfa*^^

"

ra^sa^

Date of Birth %£

*r9&ttimmpmm
-iiii

Age

v$fam

Verified fay TO^&ggg '• -g*:*ffY^^^
(Signature of Employee or Agent of Free Spirit Recreation)
I hereby dectare that I am the legal parent/guardian of applicant and give my permission for his/her participation, I wilf
assume full responsibility as stated in this contract
Parent/Guardian Signature

Mr'X^^mi^mm^^^^

••^•ffiTftT^^

I have carefully read this agreement and fully understand its contents, i am also aware that this agreement is a release of
liability and a contra&Wtomen myseif and Free Spirit Recreation. I am signing this waiver and agreements my own free
wilLtPleasslnittaOSg^gC^Li
APPLICANT SIGNATURE;
WTTN6SS SIGNATURE: VVW

"•'•7:v7r"*' r

/••tc«v

?•&:•* ~rw

APPLICANT INFORMATION
NAME:

w4j*^M*i&Ff

ADDRESS: l E S E

^t^^'ii?^—^:

• iwit^:r'H

fc££^
ffi<#-'

ZIP CODE: • • ^ • # ^ ^ > ^

.-«

OCCUPATION: !2s

£J2

REFERRED B Y r ^ - S ^ ' T t ^

lie J

m\

*i?%mttDf&3kh

•••T—?\•"*•;-- iv, :

STATS ?r>'-^ar^Y/jg?<«£-> -rry • "•-• •
WT.; ffijfo\l!^i AGE

PHONE #:
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